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NOTES
Jefferson-Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Thompson: Lienholders
Beware! Chapter 11 May Be Hazardous to Your Security
Interest's Health
Creditors in ancient times had wide latitude in dealing with delinquent bor-
rowers. One ancient Roman decree proclaimed that "'[i]f the debtor be insol-
vent to serve creditors, let his body be cut in pieces on the third market day. It
may be cut into more or fewer pieces with impunity. Or, if his creditors consent
to it, let him be sold to foreigners beyond the Tiber.' "" In colonial America,
insolvent debtors may not have been treated quite as harshly as those in ancient
Rome, but they did face the likelihood of prison if they did not or could not
repay.2 In fact, imprisonment for insolvency was permitted in the United States
until the early part of the twentieth century.3
Fortunately, modem society views debtor-creditor relations more liberally.
While the law of most states permits creditors to undertake a variety of enforce-
ment actions, 4 these statutes typically are laden with restrictions designed to
protect debtors' rights.5 At the federal level, the Bankruptcy Code6 (Code) is
designed to give debtors a "fresh start" while treating similarly situated creditors
as equally as possible.7 Individual debtors can obtain a discharge by liquidating
I. T. SULLIVAN, E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANK-
RUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 44 n.20 (1989) (quoting Twelve Tables, Table III (c.
450 B.C.)).
2. P. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT
FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900, at 5 (1974).
3. Id. at 223-25.
4. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-306 (1983) (allowing a party in whose favor a judgment is
rendered to enforce it by execution); id. § 1-410(5) (allowing the arrest of a defendant who has
removed or disposed of his property with the intent to defraud creditors); id. § 1-440.2 (permitting
attachment for the purpose of securing a judgment); id. § 1-440.21 (recognizing garnishment as a
means of attaching certain types of property belonging to the defendant).
5. North Carolina statutes are typical in this regard. See, eg., N.C. CONST. art. I, § 28 (disal-
lowing imprisonment for debt except in cases of fraud); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-47 (1983) (setting a
ten-year statute of limitations on enforcing judgments and mortgage foreclosures); id. § 1-339.54
(requiring that notice be given to a judgment debtor before conducting a public sale of his real
property); id. § 1-362 (exempting recent salary earnings of a debtor from garnishment upon a show-
ing that the money is necessary for support of the debtor's family); id. § 1-440.10 (requiring creditors
to post a bond before attaching debtor's property); id. § 1-440.39 (allowing debtor to obtain a dis-
charge of attached property by posting a bond); id. § lC-1601 (1987) (exempting certain amounts of
debtor's real and personal property from the claims of creditors); id. § IC-1705 (Supp. 1990) (al-
lowing a judgment debtor to file a motion for relief from a foreign judgment); id. § 1C-1708 (exempt-
ing from enforcement under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act any foreignjudgment deemed contrary to local public policy).
6. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1330 (1988). The Bankruptcy Code, enacted in 1978, supersedes the
old Bankruptcy Act. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), repealed by Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, §§ 101 to 411, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101 to 1330 (1988)).
7. Scott, Sharing the Risks of Bankruptcy: Timbers, Ahlers, and Beyond, 1989 CoLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 183, 186.
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nonexempt assets under Chapter 7 of the Code.8 Alternatively, under Chapter
13, they can construct a plan for repaying all or part of their debts over a three
to five year period, thus sparing the debtor the trauma of having nonexempt
assets seized and sold.9 Chapter 11 gives business entities and individuals" ° an
opportunity to reorganize their affairs free from the distraction of impatient
creditors and the burden of unmanageable debt payments.I1
The use of these provisions by both business entities and individuals has
grown dramatically in recent years. Between June 1988 and June 1989, 642,993
bankruptcy claims were filed, 12 nearly a two-fold increase in only seven years.13
Many commentators have speculated over the causes behind this upward trend,
Popular explanations usually point to the rising level of consumer debt caused
by easier access to credit; a reduction in the social stigma of bankruptcy; and
advertising by personal bankruptcy lawyers, which has led to an increased
awareness of the potential advantages to filers. 14 Many believe that the Code
itself is to blame, claiming that it treats debtors with excessive liberality, thereby
encouraging abuse. 15 Commentators cite examples such as the use of Chapter
11 by some large businesses to negate collective bargaining agreements with
their employees. 16
While academics have debated the societal impact of the Code, courts have
disagreed over the proper interpretation of specific Code provisions. One such
controversy centers on how to treat a prepetition lien when a confirmed plan of
reorganization under Chapter 11 makes no mention of or allowance for it.17
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988). Most Chapter 7 cases are rather perfunctory, since most debt-
ors have no assets beyond those that are exempt. See T. SULLIVAN, E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK,
supra note 1, at 28-30, 203. When a debtor is discharged in Chapter 7, most or all of her debts
probably will be extinguished. Id. at 30-33.
9. T. SULLIVAN, E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, supra note 1, at 33-36.
10. Although the Code's drafters designed Chapter 11 specifically to handle large business reor-
ganizations, individual debtors can utilize it as well. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (1988). The availability
of Chapter 11 for individuals may soon change, however; the United States Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in a case in which the creditor disputes an individual debtor's right to use Chapter
11. See In re Toibb, 902 F.2d 14 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct.
775 (1991).
11. B. WEINTRAUB, WHAT EVERY EXECUTIVE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT CHAPTER 11, at 1-3
(1985).
12. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 362 (1989), reprinted in REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1989).
13. In 1982, the number of bankruptcy filings was 367,866. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 388 (1982), re-
printed in REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
(1982).
14. Staten, Statistics: Bankruptcy Watch, I1 J. RETAIL BANKING 65, 68 (1989).
15. T. SULLIVAN, E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, supra note 1, at 5.
16. See, e.g., Note, The Use of Bankruptcy Proceedings to Modify Bargaining Agreement Obliga.
tions in the United States, 50 MOD. L. REV. 855, 855 (1987).
17. In a Chapter 11 proceeding, a debtor (and, in some instances, one or more creditors) sub-
mits a plan detailing how he will repay its obligations. See I 1 U.S.C. § 1121 (1988). If the requisite
majorities of creditors vote to approve the plan, it is then submitted to the court for confirmation.
See id. §§ 1126, 1128. If the plan meets the statutory requirements for approval, then the court
confirms it; the debtor emerges from bankruptcy and attempts to implement the plan. See id.
§§ 1129, 1141-42. For a description of the confirmation process, see Hopper, Confirmation of a Plan
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Although the issue has arisen infrequently thus far,18 most courts addressing
this matter have held that a bankruptcy court's confirmation of a debtor's plan
of reorganization extinguishes any claims of secured creditors not provided for
in the plan or in the confirmation order itself.19 Thus, if the final plan lists a
creditor's claim as unsecured rather than secured, the creditor will be left with
only an unsecured claim, regardless of his preconfirmation status, and will be
entitled to only those payments called for in the plan.20 At least one court has
refused to follow this line of reasoning, ruling instead that a secured claim sur-
vives a Chapter 11 proceeding and that a lienholder need not participate in order
to protect her claim.21
The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently faced this issue in Jefferson-
Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Thompson.22 After considering both interpretative
theories, the Jefferson-Pilot court held that a confirmed plan binds a lienholder
to its provisions, and that any security interest not mentioned in the plan is
extinguished.23 In so doing, the court of appeals clearly aligned itself with the
majority view on this issue.
After discussing the Jefferson-Pilot case, this Note examines the current
split of authority by discussing some of the leading cases in both camps. It then
examines the statutory language in the relevant Code provisions to determine
the meaning intended by the drafters. The Note concludes that the Jefferson-
Pilot court correctly sided with the majority of courts on this issue. The court,
however, erred seriously by failing to distinguish between cases in which the
debtor fully discloses all assets and liabilities but disputes the claims of one or
more creditors and cases in which the debtor fails to disclose the existence of
property. The court's failure to do so places its decision at odds with an estab-
lished line of cases holding that undisclosed property is not discharged from
creditors' post-bankruptcy claims.24
The plaintiff in Jefferson-Pilot, the Jefferson-Pilot Life Insurance Company,
Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and the Effect of Confirmation on Creditors' Rights, 15
IND. L. REV. 501, 504-07 (1982).
18. See, e.g., In re American Properties, Inc. (Board of County Comm'rs v. Coleman Am.
Properties, Inc.), 30 Bankr. 239, 246 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983).
19. See, e.g., In re Arctic Enters., Inc. (Minstar, Inc. v. Plastech Research, Inc.), 68 Bankr. 71,
80 (D. Minn. 1986); In re Pennsylvania Iron & Coal Co. (Pennsylvania Iron & Coal Co. v. Good), 56
Bankr. 492,496 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985); In re Penn-Dixie Indus. (Martin Marietta Corp. v. County
of Madison), 32 Bankr. 173, 179 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); American Properties, 30 Bankr. at 246.
20. See, eg., Arctic Enters., 68 Bankr. at 80. For a discussion of Arctic Enterprises, see infra
text accompanying notes 79-92.
21. See Relihan v. Exchange Bank, 69 Bankr. 122, 125 (S.D. Ga. 1985). For a discussion of the
Relihan case, see infra text accompanying notes 93-113. Both Relihan and courts in the majority
camp presuppose that the debtor has made a full and complete disclosure of all his assets so that the
court may properly evaluate the debtor's proposed plan of reorganization. Should the debtor fail to
do so, a recent line of cases holds that the undisclosed property is not protected from further claims
by creditors following confirmation. See, eg., Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank,
848 F.2d 414, 418 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 967 (1988). For a discussion of the Oneida line of
cases, see infra notes 118-40 and accompanying text.
22. 98 N.C. App. 479, 391 S.E.2d 517 (1990).
23. Id. at 484, 391 S.E.2d at 520.
24. See, e.g., Oneida Motor Freight, 848 F.2d at 418. For a discussion of the Oneida line of
cases, see infra notes 118-40 and accompanying text.
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had issued four life insurance policies on the life of Dr. John Hargett Thomp-
son.25 In 1975 Dr. and Mrs. Thompson assigned one of these policies to Branch
Banking and Trust Company (BB&T) as collateral" 'for any and all liabilities of
the undersigned [the Thompsons], or any of them, to the Assignee, either now
existing or that may hereafter arise between any of the undersigned and the
Assignee.'"26 Ten years after this transaction, the Thompsons filed a Chapter
11 bankruptcy petition.27 At the time of the filing, BB&T, a major creditor of
the Thompsons, held a second mortgage on their residence and on Dr. Thomp-
son's office and a first mortgage on two undeveloped lots. 28 The Thompsons'
total indebtedness to BB&T exceeded $115,000.29 The final bankruptcy plan
submitted by the Thompsons listed all outstanding obligations to BB&T except
for the assignment of the life insurance policy, of which no mention was made.30
The bankruptcy court approved this plan on August 22, 1986.31
Two years later, upon Dr. Thompson's death, a dispute arose over who was
the proper recipient of the net proceeds of the policy, which then totalled
$41,369.43.32 BB&T, as assignee, claimed that it was entitled to the proceeds,
while Mrs. Thompson, as named beneficiary on the policy, asserted that the final
plan as confirmed had released her and her late husband from all dischargeable
debts except those provided for in the plan itself or the bankruptcy court's or-
der.3 3 Since neither the plan nor the order made mention of the assignment, she
argued, BB&T's interest in the policy was extinguished. 34
In order to avoid possible multiple liability, the Jefferson Pilot Company
filed an interpleader action, deposited all proceeds due under the policy with the
court, and asked the court to determine the proper recipient. 35 The trial court
granted summary judgment for BB&T, Mrs. Thompson appealed, and the
North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed.36 Writing for a unanimous panel,
Judge Eagles stated that "the order of confirmation adopting the terms of the
plan is a final judgment for purposes of resjudicata on all matters relevant to the
confirmation and is therefore binding on BB&T. ' '37 Quoting Collier on Bank-
ruptCy,3 8 the court asserted that a final plan binds a creditor even if he "'is not
scheduled, has not filed a claim, does not receive a distribution under the plan,
25. Jefferson-Pilot, 98 N.C. App. at 479, 391 S.E.2d at 518.
26. Id. at 480, 391 S.E.2d at 518 (quoting assignment). This did not amount to an outright
transfer of ownership, but rather the creation of a lien on the policy in favor of BB&T. See Defend-
ant Appellant's Reply Brief at 5, Jefferson-Pilot (No. 894SC676).
27. Jefferson-Pilot, 98 N.C. App. at 480, 391 S.E.2d at 518.
28. Record at 41, Jefferson-Pilot (No. 894SC676).
29. Id.
30. Neither the court opinion nor the briefs give any explanation for why BB&T failed to catch
this omission. Jefferson-Pilot, 98 N.C. App. at 480, 391 S.E.2d at 518.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 479-80, 391 S.E.2d at 518.
34. Id. at 480, 391 S.E.2d at 518.
35. Id. at 479, 391 S.E.2d at 517-18.
36. Id. at 480-81, 391 S.E.2d at 518.
37. Id. at 481, 391 S.E.2d at 519.
38. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY S 1141.01[l], at 1141-6 (15th ed. 1989).
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or is not entitled to retain an interest under such plan.' ,,39 The court then sum-
marized some of the leading cases supporting its holding,4° discussed one case
cited as contrary authority by BB&T,4 1 and concluded that the majority view on
this issue was correct.42
As Judge Eagles noted, courts differ over the proper treatment of liens not
mentioned in a bankruptcy plan or confirmation order.4 3 This tension arises
from arguably conflicting language in two separate provisions of the Code. Sec-
tion 1141, which addresses the effect of confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan,
states, in relevant part:
(a) [T]he provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor... and
any creditor ....
(b) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order con-
firming the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of
the estate in the debtor.
(c) [E]xcept as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order
confirming the plan, after confirmation of a plan, the property dealt
with by the plan is free and clear of all claims and interests of creditors
44
Another provision of the Code, section 506(d), states: "To the extent that a lien
secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien
is void, unless ... such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the
failure of any entity to file a proof of such claim."' 45 Courts ruling that confir-
mation wipes out any security interest not provided for in the plan or the confir-
mation order point to section 1141,46 while the lone court holding that a valid
secured lien survives the proceedings and may be enforced subsequent to confir-
mation relied on section 506(d).47
One of the first cases to interpret section 1141 as extinguishing liens not
allowed for in a final plan is In re American Properties, Inc.4 8 After filing under
Chapter 11, the debtor in American Properties submitted to -the bankruptcy
court a schedule listing its assets and liabilities. 49 Among the creditors listed
39. Jefferson-Pilot, 98 N.C. App. at 481, 391 S.E.2d at 518 (quoting 5 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUrrcy, supra note 38, 1 1141.01[1], at 1141-6).
40. These cases are: In re Arctic Enters., Inc. (Minstar, Inc. v. Plastech Research, Inc.), 68
Bankr. 71 (D. Minn. 1986); In re Pennsylvania Iron & Coal Co. (Pennsylvania Iron & Coal Co. v.
Good), 56 Bankr. 492 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985); In re Penn-Dixie Indus., Inc. (Martin Marietta
Corp. v. County of Madison), 32 Bankr. 173 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). For a discussion of these
cases, see infra text accompanying notes 58-92.
41. The court discussed In re Tarnow, 749 F.2d 464 (Bankr. 7th Cir. 1984). For a summary of
this case, see infra note 93.
42. Jefferson-Pilot, 98 N.C. App. at 483-84, 391 S.E.2d at 520.
43. Id. at 481, 391 S.E.2d at 519.
44. 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1988).
45. Id. § 506(d). A "proof of claim" is a form that a creditor fills out stating that she has a
claim against the debtor for a certain amount. See B. WEINTRAUB, supra note 11, at 132.
46. See, e.g., In re American Properties, Inc. (Board of County Comm'rs v. Coleman Am.
Properties, Inc.), 30 Bankr. 239, 246 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1988).
47. See Relihan v. Exchange Bank, 69 Bankr. 122, 127 (S.D. Ga. 1985).
48. 30 Bankr. 239 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983).
49. Id. at 242.
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was Saline County, Kansas, which held a tax lien on property owned by the
debtor.50 The debtor listed all claims on its schedule as "unliquidated," mean-
ing that it disputed the amounts owed. 51 Notice of the proceedings, a proof of
claim form, and a copy of the schedule listing the county's claim as unliquidated
were sent to the county treasurer,52 but the county never responded.5 3 The
bankruptcy court approved the debtor's schedule and, three months later, con-
firmed the debtor's plan of reorganization, again with no objection from the
county.54 After confirmation, the county tried to enforce its lien, but the bank-
ruptcy court barred it from doing so. 55 With language quoted in several subse-
quent opinions, the court explained its interpretation of section 1141:
Confirmation of a chapter 11 plan has three effects. First, all
creditors are bound by the provisions of a plan whether or not the
creditor is impaired and whether or not the creditor files a claim. Sec-
ond, all property vests in the debtor, "free and clear of all claims and
interests of creditors .... [e]xcept as otherwise provided in the plan or
in the order confirming the plan." Third, a non-liquidating corporate
debtor is discharged of all debts arising before confirmation, whether
or not a proof of claim is filed. The effect of these provisions are [sic]
far-reaching. After confirmation of a chapter 11 plan, a creditor's lien
rights are only those granted in the confirmed plan. A creditor no
longer can enforce its pre-confirmation lien rights; a creditor must seek
to enforce its lien rights granted in the plan, rather than its pre-chapter
11 lien rights.56
Based on this interpretation of section 1141, the American Properties court con-
cluded that the debtor no longer could enforce its lien because the plan as con-
firmed did not recognize it.5 7
Another case decided just two months after American Properties resulted in
a similar holding. In In re Penn-Dixie Industries,"8 two counties in Iowa had
levied tax liens on certain parcels of real property owned by the debtor, Penn-
Dixie Industries.59 With the bankruptcy court's approval, Penn-Dixie sold
these parcels to a third party, Martin Marietta Corp., free and clear of the
liens. 60 As a condition of allowing the sale, the court ordered the debtor to place
50. Id.
51. Id. at 243. Ordinarily, when a debtor lists a claim on its schedule, the claim is considered
filed, thus relieving the holder of that claim from the necessity of filing a proof of claim. I 1 U.S.C.
§ 11 (a) (1988). If the debtor lists the claim as either disputed, contingent, or unliquidated, how-
ever, that claim is not deemed filed. Id. § 502(a). In such instances, the creditor must file a proof of
claim to protect its interests.
52. American Properties, 30 Bankr. at 242-43. Although the county claimed that it never re-
ceived the mailings, the court rejected this argument and held that service of process had been
adequate. Id. at 244.
53. Id. at 242-43.
54. Id. at 243.
55. Id. at 247.
56. Id. at 246 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (1988)) (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 247.
58. (Martin Marietta Corp. v. County of Madison), 32 Bankr. 173 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
59. Id. at 174.
60. Id.
1370 [Vol. 69
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a portion of the sale proceeds equal to the lien amounts in a separate bank ac-
count to which the liens would attach. 61 Shortly after this sale took place, the
court approved Penn-Dixie's plan of reorganization, which provided for an ex-
tended repayment period of the overdue county taxes.62 The counties, although
aware of these developments, made no objection to either the sale or the modi-
fied payment plan during the bankruptcy proceedings. 63 Following confirma-
tion, the counties, unhappy that the plan called for them to receive payment
over a six-year term rather than immediately, sought reformation."
The court held that, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estop-
pel, the counties could not raise prepetition claims after confirmation. 65 In de-
nying the counties' claim, the court made no mention of section 1141; instead it
relied on these two common-law doctrines.66 Nonetheless, the holding and ra-
tionale used here closely mirror American Properties: in both cases the final
plan altered the creditor's status, in both cases the creditor neglected to chal-
lenge this alteration, and, as a result, both courts limited the creditor to
whatever rights the plan provided for it.67
Two years later an Ohio bankruptcy court reached the same conclusion as
the American Properties court regarding the proper interpretation of section
1141. In In re Pennsylvania Iron & Coal Co.,68 the plaintiff coal company and
the defendant Rodney Good entered into a verbal agreement under which Good
would haul scrap metal in a large trailer owned by the company in exchange for
compensation based on a mileage/ton ratio.69 The company further agreed to
reimburse Good for any repair and maintenance costs related to the trailer that
Good might incur over the life of the contract.70 Both parties performed under
this arrangement until the coal company filed for Chapter 11 reorganization two
years later.7 1 As required by the Code, the company prepared a schedule listing
its assets and liabilities, and creditors of the company were notified of the pro-
ceedings and invited to file a proof of claim. 72 Good received a copy of the
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 177.
64. Id. at 175.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 176-78. It is unclear why the court failed to mention § 1141 in its holding.
67. Section 1141 functions like a statutory res judicata, barring claims that could have been
asserted before confirmation of the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (1988) ("ET]he provisions of a
confirmed plan bind the debtor ... and any creditor.., whether or not the claim or interest of such
creditor ... is impaired under the plan and whether or not such creditor ... has accepted the
plan."). Similarly, res judicata binds parties to a suit "not only as to every matter which was offered
and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which
might have been offered for that purpose." Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876).
The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Jefferson-Pilot implicitly acknowledged this similarity by
quoting § 1141(a) and, in the next sentence, stating that "[t]he order of confirmation ... is a final
judgment for purposes of resjudicata on all matters relevant to the confirmation." Jefferson-Pilot, 98
N.C. App. at 481, 391 S.E.2d at 519.
68. (Pennsylvania Iron & Coal Co. v. Good), 56 Bankr. 492 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985).
69. Id. at 493.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 494.
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schedule, which listed him as an unsecured creditor with claims amounting to
$14,392.54 for services rendered. 73 Good never filed a proof of claim, nor did he
object to the debtor's reorganization plan, which was proposed and confirmed
over a year after the initial filing.74 Following confirmation the company asked
Good to return its trailer but Good refused, claiming he held a lien on the trailer
for monies expended by him for repair and maintenance.75 The company sued
and the court ordered Good to release the trailer, holding that any lien Good
may have had was extinguished because neither the plan nor the confirming
order made any mention of it.76 Relying on section 1141 and on American
Properties, the court declared that "when this court confirmed plaintiff's plan of
reorganization, defendant became bound by the provisions of that plan." 77 The
court stated that the burden lies with a creditor to come forward and inform the
court if it disagrees with the proposed treatment of its claim in a reorganization
case: "[tihere is simply no other effective method for a bankruptcy court to
become aware that a creditor objects."78
The most recent case discussed by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in
Jefferson-Pilot was In re Arctic Enterprises, InC.7 9 The plaintiff debtor, Arctic
Enterprises, Inc., was a manufacturer of snowmobiles.80 Prior to filing for
Chapter 11, the company had maintained a continuing business relationship
with Plastech Corporation, a manufacturer of plastic tools and molding.81 Pur-
suant to this relationship, Plastech held in its possession certain molds, dies, and
other equipment owned by Arctic.8 2 When Arctic filed for Chapter 11, it listed
Plastech as an unsecured creditor in the amount of $105,905.83 Some months
later Plastech filed a proof of claim, in which it asserted a security interest in the
equipment in its possession.84 Arctic apparently ignored this assertion-its final
proposed reorganization plan still listed Plastech among its unsecured credi-
tors.85 Plastech made no objection to this and the court soon thereafter con-
firmed the plan.86
After confirmation, Arctic sought the return of its tools and equipment, but
Plastech refused to relinquish possession on the ground that it still held a valid
73. Id.
74. Id. at 493-94. Good later claimed that he did not understand the significance of the plain-
tiff's disclosure statement sent to him. Id. at 494.
75. Id. at 492-93.
76. Id. at 495.
77. Id. The company also claimed that, because the contract was not to be performed within
one year, it was unenforceable under the statute of frauds. Id. at 494. The court never reached this
issue.
78. Id. at 496.
79. (Minstar, Inc. v. Plastech Research, Inc.), 68 Bankr. 71 (D. Minn. 1986).
80. Id. at 73.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 79.
85. Id. at 73.
86. Id.
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security interest in these items.87 Arctic paid the claimed amount of the lien
under protest in order to obtain release of the tools.88 Two years later Minstar,
Inc., Arctic's successor in interest, sued to recover the amount paid, claiming
that Plastech's refusal to release the tools was wrongful because it had no lien in
the property.8 9 The court agreed and held for Minstar, concluding that the final.
plan, because it made no mention of Plastech's lien, extinguished any security
interest Plastech may have had.90 Plastech argued that it had filed a proof of
claim listing itself as a secured creditor and that no objection to that claim had
been made by Arctic; therefore its claim should be "'deemed allowed' " under
section 502.91 The court rejected this argument, holding that section 1141 was
controlling and that any lien not addressed by the final plan or the confirming
order was void.92
At least one court has expressly disagreed with American Properties and
declared that prepetition liens survive confirmation.9 3 In Relihan v. Exchange
87. Id. at 73-74.
88. Id. at 74.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 80.
91. Id. at 79 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1988)). Section 502 states that when a proof of claim
is filed, the claim is deemed allowed unless the debtor objects. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1988).
92. Arctic Enters., 68 Bankr. at 80. The Arctic Enterprises court noted that this treatment of
liens contrasts sharply from their treatment under Chapter 7. Courts consistently have ruled that
liens survive a Chapter 7 liquidation and that a lienholder need not participate in order to protect
her interest unless the debtor specifically challenges the secured claim. Id. The court further ex-
plained: "The rationale for requiring the debtor to actively challenge a claim upon which a lien is
based in order to extinguish the lien in a chapter 7 context is that in a chapter 7 bankruptcy there is
no plan of reorganization." Id.
93. See Relihan v. Exchange Bank, 69 Bankr. 122 (S.D. Ga. 1985). For a discussion of this
holding, see infra notes 93-113 and accompanying text. The Jefferson-Pilot court never discussed
Relihan, even though the case clearly conflicts with American Properties and its progeny. Instead,
the court of appeals discussed In re Tarnow, 749 F.2d 464 (Bankr. 7th Cir. 1984). After analyzing
Tarnow, however, the court correctly noted that the case was inapposite to the situation in Jefferson-
Pilot. See Jefferson-Pilot, 98 N.C. App. at 483-84, 391 S.E.2d at 520.
In Tarnow, the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) made to Tarnow, a farmer, a loan se-
cured by a lien on his crops and equipment. Tarnow, 749 F.2d at 464. Tarnow subsequently was
unable to meet his obligations and filed for protection under Chapter 11. Id. To expedite the reor-
ganization process, the bankruptcy court set a deadline for creditors to fie claims against the bank-
ruptcy estate. Id. CCC knew of this deadline but failed to file until two months after it had lapsed.
Id. Because of this, the bankruptcy judge barred CCC from asserting any unsecured claim it may
have had against Tarnow and, as a further sanction, declared CCC's security interest in the crops
and equipment void. Id. CCC appealed the order extinguishing its lien, the district court affirmed
the order, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. Id. Judge Posner, writing for
a unanimous panel, stated that voiding CCC's lien was a disproportionately severe penalty for a mere
failure to meet the court's deadline, given that no other party was or would be harmed by such a
failure. Id. at 465. When a plaintiff fails to file claims within the period allowed by an applicable
statute of limitations, "the sanction is dismissal; it is not to take away his property." Id. at 466.
Thus, asserted Judge Posner, CCC should not lose its security interest in Tarnow's crops and equip-
ment merely for failing to file before the court-announced deadline. Id.
The Jefferson-Pilot court correctly noted that Tarnow was not truly in conflict with the Ameri-
can Properties line of cases. Jefferson-Pilot, 98 N.C. App. at 483, 391 S.E.2d at 520. Tarnow, said
Judge Eagles, concerned the status of a lienholder who had failed to file a proof of claim before an
announced court deadline. Id. at 483-84, 391 S.E.2d at 520. Unlike the situation in Jefferson-Pilot,
the bankruptcy court in Tarnow had not confirmed a final reorganization plan at the time the dead-
line lapsed. See id. at 484, 391 S.E.2d at 520. Thus, § 1141, which deals with the effects of confirma-
tion on debtors and creditors, was not applicable. See id. Indeed, Judge Posner makes no mention
of § 1141 anywhere in the Tarnow opinion. See-Tarnow, 749 F.2d at 464-67. It seems odd that the
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Bank,94 Randolph Relihan filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11. 9" Like
the debtor in American Properties, Relihan disputed the amount owed on each of
his outstanding debts.96 Among Relihan's creditors was the Exchange Bank of
Douglas (Bank), which held a valid security interest in some of his property.97
The Bank apparently received notice of the proceedings and thus knew that the
amount of its claim was being disputed and that it was required to file a proof of
claim if it wished to contest the debtor's challenge. 98 Nonetheless, the Bank did
nothing.99
The debtor submitted a proposed reorganization plan that called for more
favorable repayment terms on the Bank's secured note.1°° Shortly thereafter
Relihan twice modified this plan, both times lowering the principal due and eas-
ing the terms of repayment still further. 10' The bankruptcy court issued an or-
der confirming the debtor's plan, which contained the most recent and most
favorable modifications.10 2 In its confirmation order, however, the court made
an express provision for the Bank's prepetition lien:
Nothing in the plan, or in this Order confirming the plan, shall be
construed to divest any lien of the Exchange Bank of Douglas or limit
the rights of the Bank to satisfy any pre-petition or post-petition claim
against the Debtor out of property which secures such claim. The
Debtor's personal, pre-petition obligation to the Exchange Bank is dis-
charged, and the Debtor's sole remaining personal obligation to the
Bank is as set forth in the plan.10 3
Relihan, unhappy with this provision, sought reconsideration of the order,
but the bankruptcy court denied review.1 4 He then appealed, 105 arguing that
the confirmation order should vest all of his property in him free and clear of all
prepetition claims and interests, including the Bank's lien.' 0 6 Section 1141, ar-
gued Relihan, conflicts with section 506(d); therefore, section 1141, which is
court of appeals would discuss a case that clearly is distinguishable while ignoring Relihan, which
conflicts more directly with the holding reached by the Jefferson-Pilot court,
94. 69 Bankr. 122 (S.D. Ga. 1985).
95. Id. at 123.
96. Id. at 123 & n.1.
97. Id. at 123.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 123-24.
101. Id. at 124.
102. Id.
103. Id. The Relihan court could have ruled in favor of the Bank without challenging the Amer-
ican Properties rule, which states that liens are extinguished unless they are provided for in the plan
or in the order confirming the plan. In re American Properties, Inc. (Board of County Comm'rs v.
Coleman Am. Properties, Inc.), 30 Bankr. 239, 246 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983); see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 1141(b) (1988) ("Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming the plan, the
confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor."). The bankruptcy court's
statement in the confirmation order clearly was an express provision for the Exchange Bank's se-
cured claim. On appeal, however, the Relihan court declined to take this route; instead it chose to
attack the American Properties holding, asserting that "American Properties... is wrongly decided."
Relihan, 69 Bankr. at 127.
104. Relihan, 69 Bankr. at 124.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 126.
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specifically applicable to Chapter 11 cases, should prevail over section 506,
which is a general provision applicable to all bankruptcy cases. 10 7 The court
rejected this argument, concluding that the two sections are not conflicting:
Section 506(d)(1) deals with "liens." Section 1141(b) revests the prop-
erty of the estate in the debtor, while 1141(c) makes all the property
dealt with by the plan "free and clear of all claims and interests of
creditors ... ." Despite Debtor's citations to the contrary, [section]
1141 does not act to extinguish valid pre-petition liens.10 8
Noting that the Code separately defines the words "claim" and "lien" in section
101, the court concluded that the drafters purposely avoided using the word
"lien" in section 1141(c) because it was their intent that liens survive bankruptcy
intact.10 9 Section 1141's "claim or interest" language, declared the court, ap-
plies only to unsecured claims. 110 Acknowledging that American Properties
took a contrary position on the issue, the Relihan court stated that it had
"wrongly decided" the matter.1 1' As for the Collier treatise on which the Amer-
ican Properties court had relied, 112 the Relihan court asserted that the treatise's
editors had misread the statutes and, moreover, had cited no authority in sup-
port of their position. 113
In Relihan, as well as in all the American Properties cases, the debtor, as an
initial matter, had fully disclosed all of its assets and liabilities to the court.
Section 521(1) requires that the debtor "file a list of creditors, and unless the
court orders otherwise, a schedule of assets and liabilities, a schedule of current
income and current expenditures, and a statement of the debtors' financial af-
fairs."114 A Chapter 11 debtor also must file a disclosure statement ' Is contain-
ing sufficient detail of its financial condition to "enable a hypothetical reasonable
investor typical of holders of claims or interests of the relevant class to make an
107. Id.
108. Id. at 127 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (1988)) (footnotes omitted).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 5 COLLIER ON BANKR TCY, supra note 38, % 1141.01[1], at 1141-6.
113. Relihan, 69 Bankr. at 127. The Relihan court posited an alternative argument in support of
its holding. It claimed that the portion of a debtor's property that is encumbered by a lien never
becomes part of the bankruptcy estate in the first place. Id. Section 541(a)(1), which addresses this
issue, states: "The commencement of a [bankruptcy] case... creates an estate. Such estate is com-
prised of all the following property, wherever located and by whomever held: (1)... all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(a)(1) (1988). The Relihan court argued that the debtor has no legal or equitable interest in
that portion of the property encumbered by a lien. Relihan, 69 Bankr. at 127. Thus, § 1141, which
applies only to property that had been part of the bankruptcy estate, would not affect the encum-
bered portion of a debtor's property or the lien encumbering it. Id.
This reading of § 541 is rather unusual and probably wrong. This misconception is apparent
from § 363, which permits the bankruptcy trustee to sell encumbered property "free and clear" of
any liens, so long as the secured interest is protected by setting aside part of the proceeds to cover the
amount of the lien. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f). In these instances, the lien would then attach to the pro-
ceeds. Clearly, § 363 assumes that the entire property, not merely the debtor's equity in that prop-
erty, is part of the estate. Thus, the drafters' interpretation of § 541 seemingly is at odds with that of
the Relihan court.
114. 11 U.S.C. § 521 (1988).
115. Id. § 1125(b).
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informed judgment about the plan."'116
Taken together, the requirements of these sections place a duty on the
debtor to schedule, for the benefit of its creditors, all its interests and property
rights.117 Several recent cases have held that when a debtor fails to disclose
property, section 1141 does not revest such property in the debtor free and clear
following confirmation.118 In Oneida Motor Freight v. United Jersey Bank,119 a
Chapter 11 debtor brought an action against one of its former creditors seven
months after it had been granted a discharge, alleging breach of its credit agree-
ments, fraudulent misrepresentation, and breach of the bank's duty of good
faith. 120 The debtor, Oneida, had not disclosed the existence of this cause of
action during its bankruptcy reorganization.1 21 Because of Oneida's nondisclo-
sure, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the suit, holding that Oneida was equitably and judicially es-
topped122 from pursuing its cause of action at this later date.123 The court was
concerned that allowing the suit to proceed could unravel the Chapter 11 plan:
The practical effect of a successful prosecution of Oneida's claim
would be to require the bank to make restitution of the amount real-
ized on its bankruptcy claim, since Oneida's present action calls into
question the bank's right to collect its secured debt. This could also
constitute a successful collateral attack on the bankruptcy court's or-
der confirming the reorganization plan.124
The court also noted that Oneida's other creditors were entitled to fair and accu-
rate information on the debtor's assets and liabilities; had the creditors known
about the cause of action, they might have voted differently on the proposed
plan of reorganization. 125 The Oneida court acknowledged that denying Oneida
the right to pursue the claim adversely affected its other creditors, since any
damage award resulting from the litigation would have accrued to them. 126 The
court noted, however, that its limited scope of review on appeal prevented it
from considering the interests of other creditors in this instance. 127
116. Id. § 1125(a)(1).
117. Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414,416 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 967 (1988). The Oneida court stressed that "[t]he importance of full disclosure is underlaid
by the reliance placed upon the disclosure statement by the creditors and the court. Given this
reliance, we cannot overemphasize the debtor's obligation to provide sufficient data to satisfy the
Code standard of 'adequate information.' " Id. at 417 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1988)).
118. See, eg., Oneida Motor Freight, 848 F.2d at 418; In re Hoffman (Hoffman v. First Nat'l
Bank), 99 Bankr. 929, 937 (N.D. Iowa 1989).
119. 848 F.2d 414.
120. Id. at 416.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 419. The Oneida court explained the doctrine of judicial estoppel as "appl[ying] to
preclude a party from assuming a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously
asserted. Judicial estoppel looks to the connection between the litigant and the judicial system while
equitable estoppel focuses on the relationship between the parties to the prior litigation." Id.
123. Id. at 420.
124. Id. at 418.
125. Id. at 417.
126. Id. at 420.
127. Id. The appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit involved only the question
whether the bank was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 416 n.3, 420.
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In another recent case involving an undisclosed cause of action, Pako Corp.
v. Citytrust,128 the court similarly held that judicial estoppel barred a suit by a
former Chapter 11 debtor against one of its creditors. 129 As in Oneida, the
debtor in Pako failed to disclose the existence of a potential cause of action
against Citytrust. 130 The court held that this failure constituted a knowing mis-
representation to the court and that Pako, the debtor, would not be allowed to
pursue the action.131 Then, the court directly addressed the situation present in
Jefferson-Pilot by stating that section 1141 does not free undisclosed assets from
creditors' claims after confirmation.' 32 The Pako court noted that, while section
1141(b) revests "'all of the property of the estate in the debtor' "following con-
firmation, section 1141(c) provides that only property "'dealt with by the
plan'" is to be "'free and clear of all claims and interests of creditors.' "1133
Property not dealt with by the plan, such as undisclosed assets, revests with the
debtor under 1141(b), but remains subject to the claims of creditors.'3 4
The Pako court discussed a 1984 case involving similar facts in which the
court reached a rather different result. In In re Auto West, Inc.. 35 the debtors
again failed to disclose the existence of a cause of action against one of their
creditors. 136 Following confirmation, the debtors petitioned the bankruptcy
court for permission to employ special counsel to represent them in pursuing the
claim. 137 The court held that the suit would be allowed to proceed for the bene-
fit of all of the debtors' creditors: "[A]pplication of res judicata, estoppel or
waiver in this case would be improper.... [T]he extinguishment of unscheduled
assets is inconsistent with the policy of the Code."' 138 The better solution, said
the Auto West court, would be to let the debtors pursue the claim under tight
supervision of the bankruptcy court, which would then distribute any proceeds
recovered from the litigation to the creditors. 139 "To permit otherwise," stated
the court, "might be an inducement for a debtor in possession to fail to schedule
claims, which might then revert to the debtor's ownership."' 4
The relevance of Oneida, Pako, and Auto West to the Jefferson-Pilot case
lies in the fact that Dr. and Mrs. Thompson never disclosed the existence of the
insurance policy; as a result, no mention of it was made in the confirmed plan.14 1
Because of this nondisclosure the court of appeals should have held that the
insurance policy revested in the Thompsons upon confirmation, pursuant to sec-
128. 109 Bankr. 368 (D. Minn. 1989).
129. Id. at 376.
130. Id. at 371.
131. Id. at 376-77.
132. Id. at 376; see I1 U.S.C. § 1141 (1988).
133. Pako, 109 Bankr. at 376 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b), (c)); see § 1141.
134. Pako, 109 Bankr. at 376. As a practical matter, Pako's cause of action was worthless be-
cause the court estopped it from pursuing the claim.
135. 43 Bankr. 761 (D. Utah 1984).
136. Id. at 762.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 764.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Jefferson-Pilot, 98 N.C. App. at 480-81, 391 S.E.2d at 518.
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tion 1141(b), but that the policy was subject to creditors' claims because it had
not been "dealt with by the plan" as required by section 1141(c). BB&T, as
holder of a lien on the policy, should have been granted the proceeds. To extin-
guish the lien and revest the property in the Thompsons free and clear, as the
Jefferson-Pilot court did, is tantamount to rewarding debtors for making misrep-
resentations to the court while penalizing lienholders for the wrongful behavior
of others. This holding may tempt future Chapter 11 debtors to hide assets in
the hope that any liens on the property will be extinguished by confirmation and
that the general creditors will not bother seizing the asset after the debtor
emerges from bankruptcy.
Had the debtors in Jefferson-Pilot made full disclosure of all assets, as did
the debtors in Relihan and in the American Properties line of cases, then the
interpretative dispute over section 1141 would have formed the proper frame-
work for the Jefferson-Pilot court's analysis. This conflict can be reduced ulti-
mately to a disagreement over definitions. The Relihan court claimed that
section 1141's use of the phrase "claims and interests" was intended to exclude
liens.142 The court noted that the Code separately defines "lien" and asserted
that the drafters intentionally avoided using the word in section 1141.143 Sec-
tion 101(4) of the Code defines "claim" as a "right to payment, whether or not
such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or un-
secured."' 144 "Lien" is defined in section 101(33) as a "charge against or interest
in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation."' 145
The Relihan court argued that, had the drafters of the Code wished to include
liens along with unsecured claims in section 1141, they could have drafted the
statute to read "claims, interests, and hens" rather than merely "claims and
interests." 146
While the Relihan court's argument certainly is plausible, it ignores the
Code's use of the word "interest" in contexts implying that the word is intended
to include hens. The Arctic Enterprises court noted this and asserted that the
word "interest" includes lien rights within its definitional umbrella.147 The Arc-
tic Enterprises court then cited several instances in which the Code used the
word "interest" in a context lending credence to this assertion.'14 Most compel-
ling is section 363(f)(3), which allows a bankruptcy trustee to sell property "free
and clear of any interest in such property... [so long as] such interest is a
142. Relihan v. Exchange Bank, 69 Bankr. 122, 127 (S.D. Ga. 1985).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10.
144. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1988).
145. Id. § 101(33). One should not confuse the concept of a "lien" with that of a "secured
claim." A lien is not a type of claim; rather, it is merely a means of securing a claim. A claim
secured by a lien is a "secured claim." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1354 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
"secure" as: "To give security;... to guaranty or make certain the payment of a debt .... One
'secures' his creditor by giving him a lien . .
146. Relihan, 69 Bankr. at 127.
147. In re Arctic Enters. (Minstar, Inc. v. Plastech Research, Inc.), 68 Bankr. 71, 79 (D. Minn.
1986). For a discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 79-92.
148. Arctic Enters., 68 Bankr. at 79.
1378 [Vol. 69
BANKRUPTCY LAW
lien." 149 Relihan supporters may counter that "interest," unlike "claim," is not
defined in the Code and that a commonly used word with multiple meanings
such as "interest" cannot be used with perfect consistency in widely differing
contexts. It is indeed true that, although the drafters sought precision in their
use of language in order to minimize ambiguities, the overlapping meanings of
certain words can frustrate even the most dedicated efforts to achieve linguistic
clarity. Nonetheless, the Arctic court makes a rather convincing case that sec-
tion 1141 affects liens as well as unsecured claims.
If one decides that "claims and interests" includes liens, then one might
conclude that sections 1141 and 506(d) are in conflict, since the former states
that confirmation extinguishes prepetition liens not included in the plan or con-
firmation order, and the latter states that failure to tile a proof of claim does not
constitute grounds for voiding. Such a conclusion, however, is not inevitable.
One may read section 506(d)150 as protecting lienholders who choose not to file
claims up to the point of confirmation, but not thereafter. Under this interpreta-
tion, a secured creditor does not have to participate in a bankruptcy proceeding
from the outset by filing a proof of claim, but would have to scrutinize the
debtor's final reorganization plan to ensure that her lien is recognized. If she
fails to do so, and if the plan contains no provision for her lien, then confirma-
tion would extinguish her interest, regardless of whether an initial proof of claim
had been fied. Under this more limited reading, section 506(d) would serve
merely to instruct the court that liens can be enforced subsequent to bankruptcy
even if the lienholders do not participate in the proceedings and that the court
should require that the debtor include them in her reorganization plan.
While this dispute over statutory interpretation is both interesting and im-
portant, it was not a controversy that the North Carolina Court of Appeals
needed to embrace, given the factual differences between Jefferson-Pilot and the
cases it cited. As stated above, the Oneida line of cases should have formed the
basis for the Jefferson-Pilot holding. 151
Nonetheless, the case is now precedent and lawyers need to advise their
clients of its ramifications. In light of the ruling, North Carolina attorneys
should advise clients holding valid security interests in property owned by a
Chapter 11 debtor to scrutinize closely the debtor's proposed reorganization
plan to ensure that their interests are accounted for. Further, creditors should
check their own records carefully to see if there are any unlisted claims they may
have against the debtor. Observing these fairly simple precautions should pro-
vide adequate protection of creditors' interests.
If the debtor's final plan already has been confirmed and it contains no
mention of the lien, then a lienholder's prospects are less promising. Creditors
in such a situation should, if possible, steer any subsequent legal proceedings in
149. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (1988).
150. Section 506(d) reads, in relevant part: "To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the
debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void, unless ... (2) such claim is not an
allowed secured claim due only to the failure of any entity to file a proof of such claim." Id.
§ 506(d).
151. For a discussion of this line of cases, see supra notes 118-40 and accompanying text.
1991] 1379
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
North Carolina involving that debtor toward federal court. Since Jefferson-Pilot
was decided on federal law grounds, 15 2 its holding is binding only in North Car-
olina state courts.15 3 If the debtor chooses a state forum and removal to federal
court is not feasible,15 4 a creditor may be able to convince a state court to rule in
its favor by raising the Oneida line of cases, which were not brought to the
court's attention in Jefferson-Pilot.155
The Jefferson-Pilot decision makes life a bit more precarious for lienholders
in North Carolina. No longer can they rely on their secured status during a
Chapter 11 proceeding. Instead they must keep themselves apprised of the case
and remain ready to assert their interests. Creditors who fail to do so ultimately
may fail to collect.
LEE J. POTTER
152. The court based its holding on its interpretation of § 1141 of the Code. See Jefferson-Pilot,
98 N.C. App. at 484, 391 S.E.2d at 520.
153. A state court's interpretation of federal law is not binding on any federal court. See R.
ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 1.4, at 13 & n.33 (1986). Moreover, the Jefferson-Pilot holding, having been decided by
the court of appeals, is not binding on the North Carolina Supreme Court.
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a) provides for removal of bankruptcy cases. It states, in relevant part:
"A party may remove any claim or cause of action in a civil action... to the district court for the
district where such civil action is pending, if [the claim is related to a bankruptcy case]." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1452(a) (1988). Removal involves issues beyond the scope of this Note.
155. See Defendant Appellee's Brief at ii, Jefferson-Pilot (No. 894SC676); Defendant Appellant's
Reply Brief at i, Jefferson-Pilot (No. 894SC676).
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